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THE REAFFIRMATION OF FEDERALISM AS
A VIABLE LIMITATION UPON THE COMMERCE POWER
INTRODUCTION
S THE Constitution was being formulated, Article I, Section 8, clause 3,
giving Congress the power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes," was added
because of the Framers' grave concern with the erection of trade barriers
between the states, a problem which had inhibited interstate trade under
the old Articles of Confederation. The federal government's regulation of
commerce was meant to provide substantial equality of access to a free
national market, avoiding what has been unhappily referred to as "the
intolerable experience of the economic Balkanization of America."'
Although the power to regulate commerce was granted, it was to
come into conflict with another ideal held by the Framers in the construction
of the new nation: Federalism. The Framers felt that the nation should
consist of a two-tier government, one national and one local, but each
sovereign in its own sphere. From time to time the Supreme Court has
taken cognizance of the federalism limitation on the Commerce Clause,
noting, for instance, that the authority of the federal government "must
be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not
be extended so as to... obliterate the distinction between what is national
and what is local and create a completely centralized government."' How-
ever, the Court has also recognized that the commerce power may be
virtually limitless.8
The conflict between the regulation of commerce by the federal
government and the exercise of state sovereignty can best be examined in light
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938' and the cases involving
its application. The FLSA was enacted by Congress as the country was
struggling to rebuild itself after being devastated by depression, primarily to
aid the economy by placing controls on the nation's work force in the
nature of a minimum wage floor and a maximum hour ceiling.5 The Act
1 American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 628, 517 P.2d 691,
696 (1973).
2 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). See Light, The Federal
Commerce Clause, 49 VA. L. Rav. 717 (1963); THE FEDERALMsT No. 45 (J. Madison) (Jones
ed. 1972).
3 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824). See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
4 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970 & Supp. V, 1975). (herein-
after referred to as FLSA).
5 See Willis, The Evolution of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 26 U. MIAm L REv. 607
(1972). [hereinafter cited as Willis].
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was passed pursuant to Congress' power to regulate commerce, and "through
the exercise by Congress of its power to regulate commerce among the
several States, to correct and as rapidly as possible to eliminate" certain labor
conditions found detrimental to the maintenance of health, efficiency, and
general well-being.6
Congress explicitly noted five reasons for the finding that labor con-
ditions within FLSA coverage affected commerce among the several states.
It found that such conditions:
(1) caused commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of
commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor condi-
tions among the workers of the several states;
(2) burdened commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce;
(3) constituted an unfair method of competition in commerce;
(4) led to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of goods in commerce;
(5) interfered with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in
commerce.
7
Throughout its history, the constitutional basis of the FLSA has remained
anchored in the Commerce Clause. However, despite the legitimacy of
that purpose, the FLSA has been the subject of constant attacks since its
inception, the most fervent of which has been the challenge to its con-
stitutionality on state sovereignty grounds.8
Two recent United States Supreme Court cases construing the constitu-
tionality of the FLSA and its amendments reflect not only the changing judicial
posture toward extension of the Act to matters of state concern, but also
the differing attitudes toward extension of the Commerce Clause itself.
6 FLSA, ch. 676, § 2, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1970). Besides
setting maximum hour and minimum wage standards, however, the FLSA also restricted
child labor abuses and retaliation by recalcitrant employers. 29 U.S.C. §§ 212, 215(3) (1970).
The present text of the congressional policy and findings section remains virtually unchangedbut for an addition, following the fifth element, "That Congress further finds that the em-ployment of persons in domestic service in households affects commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
The Equal Pay Act provisions housed within the FLSA have been viewed as resting upon
a different basis than those listed. In Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 45 U.S.L.W.2251 (3d Cir. Sept. 13, 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3651 (1977), the court said, "TheEqual Pay Act is a separate law that was enacted at a different time and aimed at a separateproblem-discrimination on account of sex in the payment of wages." 45 U.S.L.W. at 2252.Thus the constitutional basis of The Equal Pay Act is not the Commerce Clause, but Section5 of the fourteenth amendment. This distinction is important, since the tenth amendmentlimitations on Commerce Clause enactments have not been applied analogously to enact-
ments under the fourteenth amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976).
8 Willis, supra note 5, at 609. See generally Dodd, The Supreme Court and Fair LaborStandards, 1941-45, 59 HARv. L. REV. 321 (1946), for a statement of early Supreme Court
cases dealing with the coverage problems of the FLSA.
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From the date of the Act's passage until 1976, the Court adopted a defer-
ential approach to questions of state sovereignty when the federal govern-
ment was acting through its commerce power.' This approach appears in
Maryland v. Wirtz,"° decided in 1968, and it supposes that where the Court
has found, "that the legislators have a rational basis for finding a chosen
regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce," the Court's
investigation of the legislation is at an end. 1 In 1976 however, the Court's
opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery 2 reversed Wirtz and announced
that it was willing to go much further in limiting powers exercised under
the Commerce Clause than it had prior to that time. Thus, against the
commerce power were placed the "attributes of sovereignty attaching to
every state which may not be impaired by Congress,"'" an explicit recogni-
tion of state sovereignty limitations upon the Commerce Clause.
Although Usery appears to add new vitality to the tenth amendment
and, at the same time, reaffirm the validity of the concept of federalism, it
departs from the decades of logic, experience, and precedent which have
made the commerce power the broadest power of Congress. The magnitude
of this departure, as well as its significance for future judicial scrutiny of
congressional enactments under the Commerce Clause, are discoverable
only by analyzing Usery in light of past decisions regarding limitations on
congressional authority in this area.
I. THE FLSA AMENDMENTS, Wirtz AND Usery
Three major amendments to the FLSA occurred after 1960. The "en-
terprise" concept was introduced into the FLSA in 1961, shifting the basis
of coverage from the work performed by the individual employee to the
business unit in which a particular employee works. While under the original
Act it was possible to have one employee in an establishment covered by the
Act although a fellow-worker was not, the 1961 Amendments suggested
that "all the employees of a particular business unit may be covered by
the Act, regardless of the relationship of their individual duties to commerce
or the production of goods for commerce."'" In 1966, a more drastic
9 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
10392 U.S. 183 (1968).
11 Id. at 190, citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964).
12 96 S.Ct. 2465 (1976), rev'g National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826
(D.D.C. 1974).
"1 Id. at 2471. The constitutional basis for the state sovereignty argument is the tenth amend-
ment, which provides:
The Powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
14 Willis, supra note 5, at 625. Many sections of the Act refer to an employee who is merely
"employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce." See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(b), 207(a)-(2)
(1970).
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change in the Act took place from the states' viewpoint. The FLSA's
definition of "Employer" was expanded to include state employees "em-
ployed (1) in a hospital, institution, or school .... or (2) in the operation
of a railway or carrier. .. ,"" removing the total exemption the states had
previously held since the Act's inception.
These two amendments were challenged in Maryland v. Wirtz as over-
reaching the bounds of constitutionally permissible regulation of interstate
commerce. Petitioners in that case, 28 states and one school district, asserted
that the "enterprise concept" was beyond the power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause and also that coverage of state-operated hospitals and
schools was beyond the federal commerce power. 6 They sought relief from
Federal District Court in the State of Maryland in the form of a declaratory
judgment and injunction of the Act's application to hospitals, schools, and
other institutions in which the state was involved, but that relief was denied. 7
The Supreme Court affirmed, Justice Harlan delivering the opinion of
the Court.
With respect to the "enterprise concept", Harlan found two bases for
expanded coverage: First, "that substandard labor conditions among any
group of employees, whether or not they are personally engaged in commerce
or production may lead to strife disrupting an entire enterprise,"'" and
secondly, "that strife disrupting an enterprise involved in commerce may
disrupt commerce."" Moreover, Harlan relied upon the Court's earlier
approval of vast commerce powers in United States v. Darby"° and Wickard
v. Filburn2 ' to support the "enterprise concept" in Wirtz. In Darby the con-
stitutional issue involved was whether Congress could prohibit interstate
shipment of lumber which had been the product of labor by workers not
paid in accordance with the FLSA's standards even though the actual
manufacture involved was purely intrastate. In upholding the prohibition,
the Court said that regulation was permissible where intrastate transactions
"are so commingled with or related to interstate commerce that all must be
15 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970).
16 392 U.S. at 187. Petitioners also argued that the remedial provisions of the Act would
conflict with the eleventh amendment and that schools and hospitals did not have the statutorily
required relationship to interstate commerce. As to the first contention, Justice Harlan stated,
"[W]e decline to be drawn into an abstract discussion of the numerous complex issues that
might arise in connection with the Act's various remedial provisions." The latter question was
also deferred until a concrete case was brought before the judiciary. 392 U.S. at 200-01.
17 269 F. Supp. 826 (1967).
18 392 U.S. at 192.
19 Id.
20312 U.S. 100 (1941).
21317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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regulated if the interstate commerce is to be effectively controlled."22 Wickard
v. Filburn involved the issue of whether the amount of wheat grown for
home consumption could be regulated by Congress under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938, although that wheat never passed over state
boundaries. The Court held that even purely local agricultural activity could
be regulated because of its impact on the national marketing scheme, saying,
"[I]f we assume that it [the wheat] is never marketed, it supplies a need
of the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases
in the open market. Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat
in commerce."3
Justice Harlan argued that the second issue in Wirtz, whether the
commerce power affords a constitutional basis for extension of the Act
to state-operated schools and hospitals, could be decided by the controlling
precedent of United States v. California.2" That case centered upon the
extension of the Federal Safety Appliance Act to a state-owned railroad
operating entirely within California as a nonprofit venture for the purpose
of facilitating transportation at San Francisco harbor. After having de-
termined the railroad was subject to federal regulation, the Court rejected
the claim by California that its involvement precluded federal regulation,
reasoning that a business plainly within the terms and purpose of an Act
of Congress could not be exempted merely because the business was carried
on by a state. 5 Similarly, in Wirtz, Harlan reasoned that the Court would
not "carve up the commerce power to protect enterprises indistinguishable in
their effect on commerce from private businesses, simply because those
enterprises happen to be run by the states for the benefit of their citizens." 6
Justice Douglas directed his dissent to the second issue and stated
in brief what was to become the gravamen of Rehnquist's majority opinion in
Usery. Douglas believed that the 1966 Amendments invaded state sovereignty
as protected by the tenth amendment and were thus unconstitutional.2" He
contended that in no case cited by the majority on behalf of the proposition
that the commerce power was unrestrained by state sovereignty limitations
had the federal regulation overwhelmed state fiscal policies. 8 As his dissent
22 312 U.S. at 121.
23 317 U.S. at 128. Accord, United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1941).
24297 U.S. 175 (1936).
25 1d. at 186.
26 392 U.S. at 198-99.
27 Id. at 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The majority had argued against this contention by
relying upon Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925), which, in Harlan's view,
dispelled the notion that state concerns might "outweigh" the importance of an otherwise
valid federal statute. Id. at 195-96. See note 45 and accompanying text infra.
28 392 U.S. at 203.
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noted, "It is one thing to force a State to purchase safety equipment forits railroad and another to force it either to spend several million moredollars on hospitals and schools or substantially reduce services in these
areas."29 The effect upon state sovereignty, it was argued, was likely to befar greater because the regulation in Wirtz unduly impaired state functions
of government, significantly distinguishing the Wirtz case from other casesdecided under the Commerce Clause. Douglas, although recognizing what
could aptly be termed the "essential function" theory voiced by Rehnquistin Usery, provided no test for determining when uniquely sovereign functions
of the state were involved and, as indicated below, Rehnquist did not improve
the argument in this respect.3"
In 1974, Congress continued to expand the coverage of the FLSA with
the significant difference that the 1974 Amendments acknowledged nolimitation on the basis of the employer being a state or its political sub-division. Quite to the contrary, the new amendments stated that the definition
of "Employer" "includes a public agency."'" While in Wirtz Harlan haddiscounted the dissent's theory that the "enterprise concept" could declare a
whole state an "enterprise" affecting commerce and usurp its budgeting
activities, the unrelenting expansion of the Act's coverage offered no such
assurance to affected states.32
Thus, immediately following the passage of the 1974 Amendments,
another challenge to the constitutionality of the FLSA was started in the
courts. In National League of Cities v. Brennan" individual cities and
states, the National League of Cities, and the National Governors' Confer-
ence challenged the 1974 Amendments to the FLSA as beyond the power
of Congress under the Commerce Clause. Petitioners contended that the
amendments purported to extend coverage of the FLSA to nonsupervisory
state and municipal employees, requiring that state and municipal sub-divisions adhere to the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions setforth in that Act. They contended that the amendments would require
substantial increases in local expenditures or reduction in services and per-
29 Id.
30 See note 103 and accompanying text infra.
3129 U.S.C. § 203(d) (Supp. V, 1975). See 29 U.S.C. § 203(x) (Supp. V, 1975), which
provides:
"Public agency" means the Government of the United States, the government of a Stateor political subdivision thereof; any agency of the United States (including the UnitedStates Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission); a State, or a political subdivision of
a State; or any interstate governmental agency.
32 392 U.S. at 196 n.27.
33 406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd, National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S.Ct. 2465(1976).
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sonnel or both, with resultant layoffs."4 Petitioners also believed that the
amendments would result in large-scale reconstitution of tours of duty,
without any showing that state practice had formerly resulted in the types
of dangers the FLSA was designed to cure. Defendant, the Secretary of
Labor, opposed the temporary injunction requested by petitioners and
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. The three-judge district court dismissed the complaint. 5
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion written by Justice Rehnquist,
held for petitioners on the ground that "the vice of the Act as sought to
be applied here is that it directly penalizes the states for choosing to hire
governmental employees on terms different from those which Congress
has sought to impose," 6 altering the freedom of States to "structure integral
operations in areas of traditional government functions."37 In so holding, the
Court overruled Wirtz, because, like the fire and police departments claimed to
be affected by the 1974 Amendments in Usery, the employees extended
protection in Wirtz were deemed to provide "an integral portion of those
governmental services which the states and their political subdivisions have
traditionally afforded their citizens."3s Justice Blackmun concurred with
the majority's view, because he viewed the Court's opinion as adopting
a "balancing approach" between the countervailing powers of nation and
state."9
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall in dissent,
noted that "my Brethren are also repudiating the long line of our precedents
holding that a judicial finding that Congress has not unreasonably regulated
a subject matter of 'commerce' brings to an end the judicial role."4 " His
argument focused on Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden
as supporting the proposition that the restraints upon plenary commerce
power abuse lie in the political rather than the judicial process, although
the judiciary must find that the legislature had a rational basis for adopting
contested legislation. 1 Moreover, Brennan found the "essential function
34 Id. at 828. The Court stated that it was "troubled" by the states' contentions, but never-
theless adhered to the formalistic approach adopted in Maryland v. Wirtz.
35 Id.
36 National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 2473 (1976).
37 Id. at 2474.
38 Id. at 2476.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 2478 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 2476. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 9 (1824), where Chief Justice
Marshall said:
The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the
influence which their constituents possess at elections are... the sole restraints .... They
are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely in all representative
governments.
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test" used by the Court in supporting its opinion and overruling Wirtz to
be "conceptually unworkable", 2 since it involved questions peculiar to Con-
gress, not to the courts. The Court, in his view, has said that regulation
of wages and hours is an undoubted attribute of state sovereignty, but has
not said why. By disclaiming reliance on the costs of compliance the Court
avoided analysis of the wisdom, need, or effectiveness of FLSA application
to the states as "employers", questions for Congress, but it left open the
possibility that "however insignificant that cost, any federal regulation
under the commerce power 'will nonetheless significantly alter or displace
the states' abilities to structure employer-employee relationships'." 3
I. TENTH AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS
Thirty-five years ago, the constitutionality of the FLSA was challenged
for the first time in United States v. Darby, and it was there that the tenth
amendment was found to be a truism, the Court stating that "The amendment
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been lost."', Yet,
Rehnquist imposes the tenth amendment as a restriction upon the federal
government's commerce power, and goes beyond the line of cases establishing
this power as plenary.
As long ago as 1924, the principle had been established that state
concerns could not constitutionally "outweigh" the importance of an other-
wise valid federal statute regulating commerce. In Sanitary District v. United
States," Congress had imposed statutory limits on the diversion of water
from Lake Michigan by the State of Illinois, but Justice Holmes, speaking
for a unanimous Court, announced that the state's needs were "irrelevant"
because federal power over commerce was "superior to that of the States"
to provide for the welfare or necessities of its inhabitants."' In Oklahoma v.
Atkinson Co." the "plenary" aspect of the commerce power was even
supported where a dam and reservoir project extending into Oklahoma was
engineered to avert damaging floods and to promote navigation by regulating
stream-flow although the exercise of the power would obliterate part of
a state's boundary, interfere with the state's project for water development,
and impair the tax revenue of the state. It has been stated that the tenth
amendment is of no effect in such controversies since "the Amendment by
42 Id. at 2487.
43 Id. at 2484-85.
44 312 U.S. at 124. See also United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931).
45 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
46 Id. at 426.
4 313 U.S. 508 (1941). The Court also stated:
It is for Congress alone to decide whether a particular project, by itself or as part of
a more comprehensive scheme, will have such a beneficial effect on the arteries of
interstate commerce as to warrant it. Id. at 527.
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its terms is not a limitation of power", and thus, the ability to act pursuant
to the Commerce Clause cannot be denied solely by reference to that
provision of the Constitution."8
Justice Rehnquist departed from this line of authority, both in his
Usery opinion and in Fry v. United States,9 where he dissented from the
majority's view that the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 could be
validly extended to state employees notwithstanding their sovereign status.
While the majority in Fry had recognized that the Economic Stabilization
Act was an emergency measure to counter severe inflation and that the
federal effort would be drastically impaired if state employees were immune
from the Act's coverage, the extension of coverage to the States was justified
on the basis of the Court's decision in Maryland v. Wirtz.5" In Fry, Rehnquist
criticized not the reasoning in United States v. California which the Court had
relied on in Wirtz and other cases, but the precedential value of the case in
supporting the contention that state sovereignty is not a factor in determining
constitutional power under the Commerce Clause. Although Sanitary District
had dispelled the notion that the tenth amendment should form an obstacle to
the exercise of the commerce power eleven years earlier. Rehnquist found
that the Court's decision in United States v. California, announcing that
valid general regulations of commerce did not cease to be valid because a
state was involved, was based to a great extent on the historical context of
that case. Rehnquist said in Fry:
The claim of "states' rights" had so frequently been invoked in the
past as a form of ius tertii, not by the State but by a business enterprise
seeking to avoid congressional regulation, that the different tenor of
the claim made by the State of California may not have impressed
the court.5'
Thus, Rehnquist seemed to suggest that American industry had so perverted
the state sovereignty limitation into a "hands-off" tool in order to avoid
congressional regulation that its utility as a device for maintaining the
proper balance between state and federal powers had been almost totally
obscured. To suggest that laissez-faireism inhibited the Court's decision,
however, ignores not only the prior decision in Sanitary District, but also
the subsequent reaffirmation of the tenth amendment's restricted role in
Darby and Wirtz.
48 Bogen, The Hunting of the Shark: An Inquiry Into the Limits of Congressional Power
Under the Commerce Clause, 8 WAKE FoREsT L. Rv. 187, 191 (1972). See also United
States v. Perez, 426 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir. 1970).
49 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
50 Id. at 548. See note 24 and accompany text supra.
51 Id. at 551.
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In Usery, no such lengthy analysis was given to United States v. Cali-fornia. Rehnquist said, first, that "We think the dicta from United States v.
California was wrong," and left to footnote discussion the remainder of
the argument.52 He conceded that United States v. California was consistent
with Usery in that the former case did not involve an integral part of
governmental activity, only operation of a railroad engaged in interstate
commerce, but further noted that the case did not enable the commerce
power to stretch to states as states.53 Nevertheless, while United States
v. California expressly held that, in tax cases, activities in which the
states have "traditionally engaged" place a limit on federal taxing power, the
Court also stated that "there is no such limitation upon the plenary power
to regulate commerce.""4 Rehnquist's failure to give this determination
critical weight in Usery, like many of his arguments, is explained by refer-
ence to Fry, wherein Rehnquist noted that the immunity from taxation was
apparently grounded on a concept of constitutional federalism which should
likewise limit federal power under the Commerce Clause.5 This view, at
the least, ignores the historical reasons for granting broad commerce power
to the federal government, obstensibly to end the economic fragmentation
of America, by trying to analogize it to the taxing power which had en-
countered judicial opposition from the very beginning."6
More importantly, the development of the modem social structure
seems to require a relaxing of both the limits on the commerce power and
the limits on the taxing power. The Framers saw a distinction between
the powers necessary to a federal government and the preservation of
sovereign powers necessary for control of the states' internal affairs, but the
difference has been blurred by the increasingly interdependent nature of
this nation's economic structure."7 With respect to the commerce power, ithas been said that "In today's interdependent economy and social structure,
every activity within any state will 'affect the states generally' even if only
tenuously. '5 8
In Wirtz, the Court expressly declared that Congress could not use
the relatively trivial impact of state activity on commerce as an excuse
52 96 S. Ct. at 2475 nn. 18 & 19.
5 3 Id.
54 297 U.S. at 185.
5 421 U.S. at 554.56 See, e.g., Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 125 (1871) ("the means and instru-
mentalities employed for carrying on the operation of [State] governments, for preserving theirexistence, and fulfilling the high and responsible duties assigned to them in the Constitution,should be left free and unimpaired .... ); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
415, 436 (1819).
57 See Bogen, supra note 48, at 193.
58 Id. at 199,
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for broad general regulation of state or private activities, but the fear that
expanding state activities (and, thus, an expanding immunity) would prevent
exercise of federal power has been a formidable issue since the beginning
of the century.59 As state activities expanded by operating railroads, gas,
water, and electric utilities, and becoming involved in traditionally private
concerns, the Supreme Court modified the principle which since 1871 and
the case of Collector v. Day6" had immunized state activities from federal
taxation. Collector v. Day involved an assessment by a collector of the
internal revenue of the United States upon a judge of the Court of Probate
in the State of Massachusetts, which assessment, the Supreme Court main-
tained, interfered with the power of the state to administer justice "and to
employ all necessary agencies for legitimate purposes of State government."'"
However, the Court was able to draw a distinction between taxation
of a state judicial officer and taxation of state agents who had taken charge
of the business of selling liquor. In South Carolina v. United States,62 where
the state had established dispensaries for the wholesale and retail sale of liquor
and the federal government had demanded license taxes from the dispensers,
the Supreme Court announced that while immunity could stretch to ac-
tivities of a state which were of a strictly governmental character, the pro-
tection from taxation did not extend to the state in the carrying on of an
ordinary private business. This principle was affirmed in New York v. United
States,3 where Justice Frankfurter took the opposite approach of Rehnquist's
analogy in Fry and observed in his majority opinion that "surely the power
of Congress to lay taxes has impliedly no less reach than the power
of Congress to regulate commerce."6
Justice Brennan also posed the fear of an expansion of immunity in
Usery when he noted that under Rehnquist's new rule for the Commerce
Clause, states could engage in businesses competing with the private sector
and then enter the courts arguing that by withdrawing those employees
from the private sector they could successfully evade the power of the
59 P. ODEGARD, THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: ITS GOVERNMENT AND POLMcs 174 (2d ed. 1964).
6078 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
61 Id. at 128.
62 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
63 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
64 Id. at 582. While Rehnquist relies on Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) for his view
that "essential" and "peculiar" state powers could not be shorn away by Congress, the more
recent case of New York v. United States supports the proposition that while there are
"uniquely" state activities, as long as Congress taps a source of revenue by whomsoever earned
and not uniquely capable of being earned only by a state, the Constitution does not forbid it
simply because its incidence falls on a state. Apparently, this view is not embraced by Rehn-
quist's "integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions" test in Usery.
326 U.S. at 582.
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federal government to regulate commerce. 5 Rehnquist's view, in light
of this charge, proceeds in the opposite direction of the tax cases which
recognize the threat of a steady enlargement of state immunity. If this is
true, then the Court's opinion fails to recognize the historical context in
which the Commerce Clause has been used. Forkosch notes that, "beginning
with 1887, and especially since 1933, the Congress has used the Clause as
the base upon which to build a federal empire of regulations, controls, and
mandates."6 Before this time, the Commerce Clause had been used only
to overturn the states' efforts to enter the interstate area.67 Thus, the Com-
merce Clause has been used to support federal action primarily during that
time frame when the tax power immunity was being restricted. That this
new use of the commerce power should be burdened with extensive im-
munity given to the states would be inconsistent with the leaning away from
that immunity in the tax cases.
Notwithstanding the strong precedent opposing Rehnquist's sovereign im-
munity argument, Brennan also felt compelled to answer the immunity claim
on the basis of the FLSA Amendments themselves. He stated that the 1974
Amendments had not "displaced State policies" as Rehnquist had contended,
for the amendments neither imposed policy objectives on the states nor
denied the states complete freedom to fix their own objectives. 8 On its
face, this argument is unclear, for the majority opinion69 sets forth anticipated
damages resulting from the application of the Act of such an extreme nature
that, if accurate, would necessitate state policy alterations. However, the
fiscal burdens placed upon the states by congressional action are judicially
irrelevant, regardless of their enormity. In the case of Employees v. Missouri
Public Health Department,"0 where state immunity from suit against em-
ployees of its nonprofit organizations who were charging violation of the
FLSA was upheld, Justice Douglas noted that "when Congress does act,
it may place new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the states. '1' 7
How a federal regulation may compel a change in state policy is illus-
trated by District of Columbia v. Train."2 In Train, the federal government
had sought through the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 to prohibit
states from registering or allowing to operate on their streets or highways
65 96 S. Ct. at 2484. See also South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1905),
discussing a similar impact on revenue generation.
66 M. FOmyOSCH, CoNsrrUTrIONAL LAW, § 211 (2d ed. 1969).
67 Id.
68 96 S. Ct. at 2484.
69 Id. at 2471-72.
70 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
71 Id. at 284.
72 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 2224 (1976).
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any vehicles not properly equipped with emission control equipment. These
amendments were upheld, the Court stating that the regulation was "directly
related to existing activities presently being carried on by the states, and it
does not specify the manner in which the state is to comply. '73 Similar
logic is applicable to the FLSA amendments questioned in Usery. However,
other Clean Air Act Amendments involved in Train, those requiring the
states to enact laws establishing retrofit programs (programs for the installa-
tion of emission control equipment) were ruled unconstitutional because
Congress had sought "under the guise of the commerce power, to substitute
compelled state regulation for permissible federal regulation. ' I " If under the
FLSA Congress had attempted to require the states to establish programs
in the same way it had in Train, a stronger argument could be made for
sovereignty limitations than that posed by Rehnquist. But since Congress has
not made suggestions for new programs or policy choices, but only prohibited
substandard employment conditions, the states still possess the freedom
to fix their own objectives and methods for effecting those objectives, thus
retaining the "ability to function effectively in a federal system."7 5
III. SUPREME COURT TEST OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
It is next necessary to analyze the test which, prior to Usery, had been
used by the Supreme Court in analyzing Congress' exercises of power
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, for it is only by doing so that Brennan's
contention that the Court in Usery has reverted to no real test at all comes
to full view. The guiding principle for congressional action, as set forth by
Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,"6 was:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. 7
There are two factors to the analysis: first, that the end be within the
scope of the Constitution and, secondly, that the means be appropriate.
Whether the end was within the scope of the commerce power as amplified
by the Necessary and Proper Clause was tested by two means constructed
by the Court." The now obsolete "direct" and "indirect" distinction arose,
73 Id. at 991.
74 Id. at 992.
75 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
76 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819).
77 Id. at 421.
78 The Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, provides that Congress
shall have power:
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers resting by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
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providing that only activities with "direct" effects on interstate commerce were
within the commerce power,7" and the broader test of "substantial economic
effect" on interstate commerce followed.8" One cannot find cases during
the last thirty-five years in which a "substantial" relationship has not been
found, but as noted above, the Wirtz case reaffirmed the point that a rela-
tively trivial impact would not be sufficient to justify broad general regu-
lation."' Such seemingly outright acquiesence in the acts of Congress led
Wechsler to question
Whether there are any neutral principles that might have been employed
to mark the limits of the commerce power of the Congress in terms more
circumscribed than the virtual abandonment of limits in the principle
that has prevailed."2
The second facet to be considered is whether the legislative means are
appropriate. Since 1922 and the case of Stafford v. Wallace,8" the Court has
recognized a "rational basis" test for congressional action. In Stafford, a
stockyard company incorporated by the State of Illinois challenged the con-
stitutionality of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 insofar as that Act
provided for supervision by the federal government over business conducted
by commission men and live stock dealers throughout the country. Finding
that Congress had amply studied the restraint on interstate commerce caused
by price-fixing in the stockyards industry, the Court concluded, "This court
will certainly not substitute its judgment for that of Congress in such a
matter unless relation of the subject to interstate commerce and its effect
upon it are clearly nonexistent.""
The "rational basis" has been found where the full range of the
79 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
80 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 122-23 (1942) announced that the "direct"-"indirect"
test was a fiction of the past; NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, (1937),
regarded the issue as one of degree rather than category.81 392 U.S. at 197, n. 27. See also Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157 (1976) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
82 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 23-24
(1959). See FoRKoSCH, supra note 66, § 211, where it was noted:
To a degree, even Congress has recoiled from the ultimacy of its power, and has legis-
latively limited statutes judicially upheld, or has accepted judicial constructions which did
not permit extreme power where not specifically authorized, assuming existence.
83 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
84 1d. at 521. The Court noted that for two decades the "Big Five" packing establishments
(which did not include Stafford Brothers) had engaged in violation of the Anti-Trust Law,
and in 1917 the President ordered the Federal Trade Commission to investigate. The Com-
mission concluded:
The "Big Five" packing firms had complete control of the trade from the producer to
the consumer, had eliminated competition, and that one of the essential means by which
this was made possible was their ownership of a controlling part of the stock in the stock-
yard companies of the country. Id. at 500.
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wheat industry was being regulated;5 where discrimination by restaurants,
if left unchecked, could have a substantial effect on commerce; 86 and where
extortionate credit transactions, viewed as a class, were seen to affect
interstate commerce, including interstate crime." In most recent cases
involving the commerce power, the "rational basis" test has been met.
Although the tenth amendment has been relegated to the position of
a "truism" in regard to exercises of the commerce power, its significance
for the "rational basis" test deserves more than passing mention. The fact
that the amendment's purpose was to "allay fears that the new national
government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states
might not be able to exercise in full their reserved powers" justifies insisting
that some care be taken by the courts to assure the congressional finding
of a "rational basis" required to support the commerce power exercise in
a particular instance has been made. 8 Therefore, in commerce cases involv-
ing congressional authority to act, the Supreme Court has been careful in
assuring, even if not specifically stated in the act, that Congress has found
a relationship between the particular act and the commerce power granted.89
This practice is sharply distinguishable from those cases where the Court
has been engaged in examining state legislation with respect to the Equal
Protection Clause, since it has in those cases engaged in sheer speculation
to determine whether the state legislature had conceived of the relationship
between a law and the legitimate state interest."0
Even in commerce cases, however, except for finding a "rational basis"
for the legislation, the Court has decried the policy of weighing the dangers
which prompted congressional action and substituting its determination for
85 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
86 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
87 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
88 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
89 See, e.g., Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 17 (1923) (In determining whether
the Grain Futures Act of 1922 was unconstitutional because the obstacle or burden to inter-
state commerce sought to be alleviated did not exist, the Court stated, "When the existence
of constitutional power depends on a certain fact or condition, this Court must for itself
determine whether that fact or condition really exists".); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68
(1922) ("A reading of the act makes it quite clear that Congress sought to use the taxing
power to give validity to the act. It did not have the exercise of its power under the com-
merce clause in mind...."). See Stafford v. Wallace, note 83 and accompanying text supra.
9 0 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426-27 (1961) ("The record is barren
of any indication that this apparently reasonable basis [for exceptions to the Maryland Sun-
day Closing Laws] does not exist."); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
110 (1949) ("The local authorities may well have concluded that those who advertise their
own wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic problem" [as do advertising
vehicles]).
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that of Congress.9 In the recent case of United States v. Bass," treating the
relationship of Section 1202(a)1 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act to interstate commerce, the Court imposed a new limitation
upon probative facts which could be used to satisfy the "rational basis" test.
The Court in that case noted that "unless Congress conveys its purpose clear-
ly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state
balance.""8
Rehnquist focused neither on the "rational basis" test nor the effect the
tenth amendment has had on that test since Stafford. On the contrary, he ar-
gued that the appellants were not challenging the authorities establishing the
breadth of authority under the Commerce Clause, but that "when Congress
seeks to regulate directly the activities of States as public employers, it trans-
gresses an affirmative limitation on the exercise of its power akin to other
commerce power affirmative limitations... ."" The other limitations referred
to are represented by the cited cases of United States v. Jackson9 and Leary
v. United States", involving fifth (due process) and sixth (trial by jury)
amendment limitations on exercise of the commerce power. Each case in-
volved an individual seeking to uphold his constitutionally granted rights on
the basis of the Bill of Rights. In Jackson, the Court declared unconstitutional
one part of the Federal Kidnapping Act because it made "the risk of death"
the price one would pay in requesting a trial by jury, since only with a jury
finding could a defendant be executed. In Leary, the Court held that the stat-
utory presumption resting in the Marihuana Tax Act that a possessor of mari-juana was deemed to know of its unlawful importation denied petitioner due
process of law under the fifth amendment.
Justice Rehnquist, as indicated more clearly in his Fry dissenting opin-
ion, was seeking to place the state claiming violation of right under the tenth
amendment on the same basis as an individual claiming violation under the
fifth or sixth amendments.9" Such a view is tenuous at best for two reasons.
9 1 Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 521 (1922). See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183,190 n.13, (1968), where the Court said, "We are not concerned with the manner in which
Congress reached its factual conclusions."
92404 U.S. 336 (1971).
9 Id. at 349. The fact that the Court required a rational nexus to interstate commerce beproven in the case of all three offenses set forth in the Act, "possession", "receipt", or "trans-
portation" of firearms, is not the result of a desire to provide stricter scrutiny in "rationalbasis" analyses, but follows from the ambiguity of the statutory language itself. See 404
U.S. at 339.
9, 96 S. Ct. at 2469.
95 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
96 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
97 421 U.S. at 553 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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First, it has already been noted that the tenth amendment has not been cap-
able, at least in this century, of providing absolute immunity to states while
engaged in "private" activities. 8 However, the application of the fifth and
sixth amendments has not been so limited by the function in which the indi-
vidual claiming their protection has engaged. Secondly, the rule laid down by
the courts in both the tax cases" and the commerce cases"0 has been that a
state engaging in economic activities that are validly regulated when private
persons engage in them renders the state amenable to the regulation. This rule
places the state and the individual on a closer parallel than Rehnquist's view,
because if the individual can challenge an allegedly valid regulation of com-
merce successfully, so too may a state.
But there was a deeper problem with the type of "state interest" analy-
sis engaged in by Rehnquist when examining the protection afforded by the
tenth amendment. This is the problem indicated by the Brennan dissent, and
suggested by the Blackmun concurring opinion that the Court "adopts a balan-
cing approach." '' The Court sacrificed its judicial role and adopted a legis-
lative function, as borne out by the legislative history of the 1974 Amend-
ments to the FLSA. Although an initial veto of the amendments was sus-
tained because they had interfered with state prerogatives, the President later
signed the amendments after Congress had moderated its position, noting that,
"Congress has reduced some of the economic and social disruptions this exten-
sion could cause by recognizing the unique requirements of police, fire, and
correctional services. '  Clearly, Congress was forced to recognize and take
account of the burden it was imposing upon the states. For the Court to pro-
ceed in the same sort of investigation that Congress has undertaken, to ex-
amine the degree of displacement of state power, the cost to the state in
compliance, and whether there was any factual predicate for the legislation,
adopts a balancing that should go on in Congress. In Usery, Rehnquist denied
reliance upon these factors,"0 3 yet a test involving the question whether "Con-
gres has sought to wield its power in a fashion that would impair the states'
'abilities to function effectively [with] in a federal system'" is an empty test
unless based on such an analysis.10'
Nor would this be the first time a nonjudicial role had been adopted by
the judiciary, although it is the first time it has been adopted in the context of
98See notes 59-64, and accompanying text supra.
19 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
100 E.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1968).
101 96 S. Ct. at 2476.
102 10 WEEKLY Comin. OF PREs. Docs. 392 (1974).
103 96 S. Ct. at 2471.
104 Id. at 2474.
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congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause. When the Court was
using the Commerce Clause to limit state action infringing on interstate com-
merce, the two cases of Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona'° and Dean Milk Co.
v. City of Madison"6 point to the fact that the Court was involved in a bal-
ancing between the burden on commerce relative to the state's benefit.' In
Southern Pacific, the Court observed that it had full power to decide
The nature and extent of the burden which the state regulation of inter-
state trains, adopted as a safety measure, imposes on interstate com-
merce, and whether the relative weights of the state and national in-
terests involved are such as to make applicable the rule, generally
observed, that the free flow of commerce and its freedom from local
restraints in matters requiring uniformity of regulation are interests
safeguarded by the commerce clause from state interference.'
Then the Court proceeded to weigh the relevant factors causing conflict
among states and reached a determination that the Arizona law interfered with
interstate commerce. In Dean Milk Co., Justice Clark stated that since
"reasonable and adequate alternatives are available", which he proceeded to
denote, the City of Madison had adopted "a regulation not essential for the
protection of local health interests."' 9
In each case, the opinion of the Court was followed by a vigorous dissent
by Justice Black. In Southern Pacific, Black said:
If under today's ruling a court does make findings, as to a danger con-
trary to the findings of the legislature, and the evidence heard "lends
support" to these findings, a court can then invalidate the law. In this
respect, the Arizona County Court acted, and this Court today is acting,
as a "super-legislature".110
In Dean Milk Co., Black countered the opinion of the Court not only with
the contention that a health law had never previously been struck down on the
ground that some other method of safeguarding health would be as good as the
one the Court was called upon to review, but with the argument that if the
Court were going to propose legislation, it should at least have hearings on
its proposals."' In such a manner, Justice Black sought to narrow the role
LO5 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
106 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
10T See also Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924).
108 325 U.S. at 770-71.
109 340 U.S. at 354-56.
110 325 U.S. at 788 (Black, J., dissenting). The problem recognized by Black was that the
type of balancing advocated by the Court necessitated study of all the evidence offered asto why the legislature passed the law, the Court sitting as a final body of review as to the
validity of those reasons.
111 340 U.S. at 358-60.
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of the Court in overruling legislation on a "legislative" rather than a judicial
basis. The final fruition of Black's view was stated in Fireman v. Chicago R.I.
& P.R. Co.,"' where Black, speaking for the Court, said that in looking to
the financial burden of compliance with the law in question and the added
burden to the railroad, "the District Court indulged in a legislative judgment
wholly beyond its limited authority to review state legislation under the
Commerce Clause."" 3
The entrance into the domain of state interest in Usery might be thought
necessary if Congress itself had not weighed the conflicting considerations
adequately. The possibility is at least partially overcome by the fact that Con-
gress itself stated its findings in Section 202(a) of the amended FLSA."
There is, thus, a probative fact upon which the Court could base a decision
that Congress had found a rational basis between its legislation and the protec-
tion of interstate commerce. Viewing this fact and confirming that there was
a "rational basis" for the legislation should end the analysis, and Brennan fully
recognizes this fact." 5 Nevertheless, Rehnquist states a rule necessarily re-
quiring the Court to adopt precisely those functions denounced by Justice
Black if it is to be other than nonsense.
IV. LIMITS ON THE COMMERCE POWER
Although Rehnquist's argument flies in the face of the logic in
inescapable precedent, it is not without its own justification. At one time,
the Commerce Clause was viewed as having one steadfast limitation, but
that has all but disappeared. Chief Justice Marshall noted that the Com-
merce Clause did not "comprehend that commerce which is completely
internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State,... and which
does not extend to or affect other States...,,?16 It has been contended,
however, that because of the decision in Wickard v. Filburn it is difficult to
discern a meaningful limit to the power." 7 Indeed, Justice Murphy, deliv-
ering the opinion of the Court in North American Co. v. SEC"' four years
later, said that "nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress from acting
in time to prevent potential injury to the national economy from becoming
a reality.""19 Such decisions have given rise to the feeling that the only com-
112 393 U.S. 129 (1968). In Fireman, a group of interstate railroads operating in Arkansas
challenged the Arkansas "full crew" laws, which required minimum train crews for interstate
rail operations, as unconstitutional, because they exempted intrastate railroads from their
requirements.
113 Id. at 136.
114 See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
115 See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
116 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 7 (1824).
"17 Light, supra note 2, at 728.
118 327 U.S. 686 (1946).
119 Id. at 711. See American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946).
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merce questions left to be decided by the Court are those involving statutory
interpretation.' 2° Rehnquist's opinion may then be viewed as a conscious andjustifiable, even if unstructured, backstep from a line of judicial precedent
granting Congress too much discretion in the exercise of commerce power.
More to the point, it has been recognized that "a consistent trend of
unrelenting expansion of [the FLSA] protection to employees, heretofore
without embrace is clearly discernible."'' Even more importantly, much
of the advancing augmentation of the Act's outward reach is not being
fostered by Congressional amendment, but by the judiciary.'22 Indeed, the
Court in Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling2 ' noted:
Unlike the Interstate Commerce Act and the National Labor Relations
Act and other legislation, the Fair Labor Standards Act puts upon the
courts the independent responsibility of applying ad hoc the general
terms of the statute to an infinite variety of complicated industrial
situations. 2"
Thus, expansion of the Act's coverage is not difficult, and no less inviting
because the states have failed in their moral responsibility to the laboring
classes.' If it is true that the Supreme Court now carries the burden of
protecting the states from creeping nationalism and the destruction of the
concept of federalism, as exhibited by expanding federal coverage of lake
shipping, railroads, airplanes, broadcasting, and other areas, then is it also
true that the Supreme Court must take a more active role in what it perceives
to be a diminishing recognition of state interests?'26 It would seem that by
limiting Congress' power by an examination of state interests, the Court
would be, as it is in Usery, passing on the wisdom of the legislature while
clothing the decision with the formalities of constitutional construction.
Actions of Congress which pierce the sphere of state action are not
without restriction, for Brennan himself argues that the control of Congress
120 Light, supra note 2, at 728.
121 Willis, supra note 5, at 632.
1 22 Id. at 633.
123 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
1
2 4 Id. at 523.
125 Willis, supra note 5, at 634, stating:
The most ideal avenue for elimination of such confusion and achievement of FLSAprotection lies within the legislatures of the states. Unfortunately, it seems the states
have developed the habit of shirking their responsibilities of social legislation, leaving
the task to the overburdened federal government.
See also Comment, Colorado Wage and Hour Law: Analysis and Some Suggestions, 36
U. CoLo. L. REV. 223 (1964).
126 See M. FoRxoscl, supra note 66. But see Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federal-
ism: The Role of the States In the Composition and Selection of the National Government,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559 (1954).
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is vested in the people who have the power to elect their representatives."'
The weakness in the contention that this control is sufficient for protection
of state sovereignty, however, is that it fails to recognize that elected Con-
gressmen may perceive a greater benefit to the public good from federal
control than from state sovereignty. Thus, the limitation, at best, seems
insubstantial in this regard. Wechsler would disagree, for he believes that,
"Far from a national authority that is expansionist by nature, the inherent
tendency in our system is precisely the reverse, necessitating the widest
support before intrusive measures of importance can receive significant
consideration." '128 He finds that despite the rise of national parties and the
shift to popular election of the Senate, the Madisonian analysis of the state
government as a constituent and essential part of the federal government
still prevails. 9
Yet, Wechsler's contention suffers from the same weakness of equivoca-
tion Brennan's suffers from: Decisions by representatives of the people are
not necessarily decisions of the states themselves. Rehnquist himself points
to the obvious distincting in his criticism of the dissenting opinion in Usery,
stating that Brennan's contention that "Decisions upon the extent of federal
intervention under the Commerce Clause into the affairs of the States are
in that sense decisions of the States themselves",' follows from unclear
reasoning, since members of the House are elected from the states and, since
adoption of the seventeenth amendment, Senators are not dependent upon
the state legislatures for their appointment."'
Wechsler, however, views the election of Congressmen at the local level
as supplemented by other inherent tendencies of Congress to limit itself in
its own exercise of power. Wechsler notes that "Even when Congress acts,
its tendency has been to frame enactments on an ad hoc basis to accomplish
limited objectives, supplanting state-created norms only so far as may be
necessary for the purpose."1 2' There are two reasons for this self-limitation:
(1) Control may be imposed where the local majority finds control un-
necessary, and (2) Congress may attenuate control in areas where it is really
needed. Yet, in the five years between setting forth this belief and his
discussion on neutral principles of constitutional law, Wechsler found an
additional factor, the Supreme Court, to be an integral factor in the control,
127 96 S. Ct. at 2477.
f28 Wechsler, supra note 126, at 558.
129 Id. at 546.
130 96 S. Ct. at 2486.
131 Id. at 2469 n.12.
132 Wechsler, supra note 126, at 545.
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or lack of it, over the commerce power. 3' He believes that a real factorin the failure of the Court to contain national power as it did in cases like
Hammer v. Dagenhart,T" where the Court determined that a prohibition
on interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor was invalid under
the tenth amendment because its practical effect was to control production,
was the inability to articulate an adequate analysis of the restrictions itimposed on Congress in favor of the states, whose representatives "broadly
acquiesced" in the congressional enactments.' Wechsler does not conclude
that a larger role by the Court would have been more proper in application
of the Commerce Clause, however. At best, he suggests that judicial thought
should have centered upon neutral principles better adapted to the situation
than the "virtual abandonment of limits in the principle that has prevailed.""1 6
He does not seem to condone the type of unstructured "balancing" analysis
undertaken by Rehnquist even if a larger judicial role were desired.
CONCLUSION
The more difficult question presented by Usery is the one not answeredhere: How much regulation of commerce, whether interstate or intrastate
which affects interstate commerce, should be permitted under the Commerce
Clause? An argument can be made from the States'-righters side and fromthe nationalist position, each side having equal justification for its view." 7But the answer involves a series of value judgments. A second questionpresented by Usery is whether the Supreme Court should adopt the function
of an arbiter between national and state powers to prevent infringement of
one tier upon another's rights and the concurrent destruction of federalism.In the face of precedent and the ideal of separation of powers, it is whollyinappropriate for the Court to place itself in the shoes of the legislature todetermine the wisdom of certain laws beyond a mere "rational basis" and
a criticism of the Usery opinion standing on this ground will find only faultin Justice Rehnquist's opinion. Whether a justification of that opinion upon
the historical ground of an ever-expanding national power under the Com-
merce Clause will rise above the criticism of Rehnquist's opinion on judicial
grounds depends upon the answer to the first, and more difficult, question.
But perhaps the most detrimental aspect of the Usery opinion is its
escape from the judicial test that interstate commerce must be "affected"
and that there must be a "rational basis" for congressional regulation of
commerce. Left to itself, Rehnquist's opinion in Usery says nothing about
133 Wechsler, supra note 82.
134 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-116 (1941).
135 Wechsler, supra note 82, at 23.
1l6 Id. at 24.
1"7 J. BURNs, J. PELTASON, & T. CRONIN, GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 91 (9th ed. 1975).
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the next case to come before the Court, outside of the fact that congressional
power cannot interfere with functions essential to state sovereignty. What
test shall be used in making the determination of functions essential for this
purpose is not clear. Reliance on cost of compliance to make the determina-
tion is, of course, denied, but no guidelines are set out to replace the rejected
formula.
Moreover, even if valid judicial guidelines were provided, the detriment
to the judicial process over the last thirty years, and perhaps to the next
thirty as well, may be substantial. Consistency in application of principle
is at least as important as principled decisions themselves, for one aspect
of the problem no less than the other may lead to arbitrariness, genuine
or imagined. Consistency has been upset by the opinion in Usery, as sug-
gested by Professor David Bogen:
For almost thirty years, the Court has recognized that 'even if appellee's
activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it
may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.' For thirty years
the court has stated that if Congress has power under the commerce
clause, its power is not limited by the Tenth Amendment."8
Yet, the question remains whether the Court will continue to assert the sort
of ad hoc balancing of interests approach employed in Usery rather than
continue in its apparently non-restrictive, but principled, approach consis-
tently accepted in cases like Wirtz. At the least, Usery and its aftermath
will require the Court to make a closer examination of its own perceived
functions in the area of congressional exercises of power under the Com-
merce Clause.
RANDY R. KOENDERS
1as Bogen, supra note 48, at 188.
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